Security-Chattel Mortgages-Mortgage Recorded Under Federal Aviation Act of 1958S as Affected by State Laws by Brashares, William C.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 61 Issue 8 
1963 
Security-Chattel Mortgages-Mortgage Recorded Under Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958S as Affected by State Laws 
William C. Brashares 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, Secured Transactions Commons, and the 
Transportation Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William C. Brashares, Security-Chattel Mortgages-Mortgage Recorded Under Federal Aviation Act of 
1958S as Affected by State Laws, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1579 (1963). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol61/iss8/9 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1963] RECENT DECISIONS 1579 
SECURITY-CHATI'EL MORTGAGES-MORTGAGE RECORDED UNDER FEDERAL 
AVIATION Ac:r OF 1958 As A.FFEc:rED BY STATE LAws-Defendant, a Michigan 
corporation, ordered a new airplane from Air-O-Fleet, a retailer. Air-O-
Fleet financed its purchase from the manufacturer through a loan from 
plaintiff, a Texas corporation, who took a chattel mortgage on the air-
plane. One day after Air-O-Fleet had made delivery to defendant and 
received full payment, plaintiff recorded the chattel mortgage with the 
Federal Aviation Authority in accordance with the Federal Aviation Act 
of 1958, section 1403, which provides that "no conveyance or instrument ... 
shall be valid ••. against any person other than the person by whom the 
conveyance or other instrument is made or given, ... or any person having 
actual notice thereof, until such conveyance is filed for recordation in the 
office of the Administrator.''1 Air-O-Fleet became bankrupt, and plaintiff 
filed suit against the defendant to recover the airplane or, in the alternative, 
the amount owing on the mortgage. On a motion by the plaintiff for sum-
mary judgment,2 held, denied. Since the conveyance to defendant preceded 
recordation of the mortgage, defendant took absolute title to the airplane 
unless he had actual notice of the mortgage. Even upon a trial determina-
tion that the defendant had actual notice, if the mortgage were otherwise 
void as to defendant under state law, federal recording would not save 
it.3 Aircraft Investment Corp. v. Pezzani b Reid Equipment Co., 205 F. 
Supp. 80 (E.D. Mich. 1962). 
1 72 Stat. 806 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) (Supp. III, 1961). Section 1403(d) of the 
act provides that "each conveyance or other instrument recorded by means of or under 
the system provided for in subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall from the time of 
its filing for recordation be valid as to all persons without further or other recordation." 
The effect of this section is to make constructive notice effective at the time of filing, 
thereby removing the possibility of a bona fide purchase between filing and recordation, 
as occurred in Anderson v. Triair Associates, Inc., 1949 U.S. Av. 440 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1947). 
See Kerley Chem. Corp. v. Colboch, 145 Cal. App. 2d 509, 302 P.2d 621 (1956). 
2 Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment without an offering of proof of actual 
notice appears to have been made in the belief that defendant's failure to record, 
or plaintiff's prior recording, precluded all other considerations. This involves a 
characterization of § 1403 as a "race" statute-a notion which seems erroneous on 
the face of the statute and is unsupported by authority. See Bishop v. R. S. Evans, 
East Point Inc., 80 Ga. App. 324, 56 S.E.2d lll4 (1949). 
3 The court referred to the possibility that defendant's reliance on the conduct 
of plaintiff created a waiver of the mortgage lien. See Fidelity Corp. v. Associates Dis-
count Corp., 340 Mich. 610, 66 N.W.2d 235 (1954); Coleman Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Mahan, 
168 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) (mortgage stated that Texas law would govern 
all rights under the instrument). The court also mentioned the possible application 
of a Texas statute (TEX. R.Ev. CIV. STAT. art. 4000 (1948)], which makes void a chattel 
1580 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
The significance of this decision is in its rejection of the view that 
compliance with section 1403 of the federal act is the sole criterion for the 
validity of an aircraft mortgage. The court specifically stated that the 
federal enactment did not pre-empt the field of aircraft conveyancing, 
holding that the plaintiff must also contend with state law relating to 
conveyances, e.g., waiver of lien, estoppel to assert prior mortgage, which 
might protect the defendant from a claim under the mortgage, as well as 
the defense available under section 1403 that he had no actual notice 
of the prior interest. The apparent conflict of this decision with dicta 
in In re Veterans' Air Express Co.4 poses the difficult problem of defining 
the scope of federal regulation of aircraft conveyancing and determining 
if, and to what extent, state law remains applicable. 
The court in Veterans' Air Express was primarily concerned with the 
question whether the recording provisions of the Federal Aviation Act 
could be made applicable to a Government mortgage on an aircraft 
.operated solely in intrastate commerce. In upholding the constitutionality 
of such an application,5 the court thereby held the Government's federally 
recorded lien senior to a mechanic's lien for repairs accomplished after 
the recording,6 and in dictum observed that Congress had "pre-empted" 
the entire field of aircraft conveyancing. This concept of "pre-emption" 
is subject to several interpretations. One possible meaning could be that 
Congress had nullified the effect of state law upon interests in aircraft 
by providing exclusive procedures in relation to such conveyances.7 A 
more reasonable interpretation of Veterans' Air Express, however, would 
appear to be that the term "pre-empt," as there used, refers to the con-
clusive seniority of Government liens,8 an interpretation more in keeping 
with the court's emphasis upon the power of Congress to accord seniority 
to federal liens. This concept of "pre-emption" found strong support in 
the congressional hearings on the original Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.9 
There it was stressed that, because of the increasing use of federal loans for 
mortgage on goods "daily exposed for sale" regardless of actual notice to the purchaser. 
See City Bank v. Phillips, 190 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1951); see also Donahue Inv. Co. v. 
H. E. McMasters Co., 301 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). 
4 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948). 
5 In reaching this decision, the court recognized the practical necessity of regulating 
intrastate aircraft interests in order to effectuate interstate policy. This view is sup-
ported by United States v. Darby L.umber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941,); NLRB v. Jones &: 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Accord, Dawson v. General Discount Corp., 
82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.E.2d 653 (1950); Blalock v. Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 S.E.2d 610 
(1949). Contra, Aviation Credit Corp. v. Gardner, 174 Misc. 798, 22 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sup. 
Ct. 1940); 48 CoLUM. L. REv. 1248 (1948); 10 u. Prrr. L. REv. 79 (1948). 
6 When the different sequences of recording and lien accrual are considered, the 
cases are easily distinguishable on their facts; therefore, the conflict does not go be-
yond the dicta in Veterans' Air Express. 
7 See Dawson v. General Discount Corp., 82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.E.2d 653 (1950). 
8 See Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities, 25 J. Am L. &: CoM. 193, 203 (1958). 
9 See Hearings on H.R. 9738 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 406 (1938) (hereinafter cited as Hearings). 
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aircraft financing under the Reconstruction Finance Act, it was necessary 
to protect Government mortgage liens by means of a central recording 
system. Furthermore, in the later case of United States v. United Aircraft 
Corp.,10 the court mentioned in dicta that the only basis for federal lien 
supremacy appeared to be the need for protection of Government prop-
erty from the crippling effect of private liens; hence, where the Govern-
ment is a mere security holder, it should be subject to the same rules 
of validity and priority applicable to any other party. This language not 
only qualifies the broad assertion of federal pre-emption in Veterans' Air 
Express, but apparently recognizes the vitality of state law regarding the 
validity of security interests as well as the relative priority of various 
interests in the presence of federal recordation.11 
Another interpretation of Veterans' Air Express, one which serves to 
reconcile it with the principal case, would be that Congress has only sub-
stituted a federally-determined set of priorities for the order presently in 
force according to state law, nevertheless leaving intact all of the related 
doctrines which affect the priority structure. The purpose of federal re-
cordation was to provide prospective purchasers with nationwide notice 
of asserted claims against aircraft.12 This notice provision was responsive 
to the fact that the extreme mobility of aircraft had made recording in 
the state of purchase insufficient to inform adequately, rather than to a 
desire for uniform rules of conveyancing or priority.13 To require, as does 
the principal case, that a conveyance or security interest be valid under 
the related state doctrines of estoppel or waiver before it can be protected 
by federal recording does not defeat the purpose of providing notice; it 
merely gives the purchaser who has such constructive notice a right to 
claim the invalidity of the prior interest by virtue of these related doctrines. 
Nor is this a departure from the philosophy of state recording systems, 
which deny validity to a mortgage which fails to meet other substantive 
requirements.14 Therefore, apart from the possibility of a legislative intent 
to protect Government liens, it seems clear that the federal act was meant 
only to provide notice on a nationwide scale, leaving the states free to 
enforce additional requirements for the validity of conveyances or the 
priority of certain types of liens. 
It is conceded that Congress, under its power to regulate interstate 
commerce, could exclusively regulate every phase of aviation.15 In the reg-
ulation of passenger and freight airline competition, and the enforcement 
10 80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948). 
11 See Scott, supra note 8, at 203-04. 
12 See Marshall v. Bardin, 169 Kan. 534, 220 P.2d 187 (1950). 
13 Hearings 407. 
14 See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § II2 (2d ed. 1936). It jg clear that state 
recordation systems were made inapplicable to interests in aircraft by the establish-
ment of a centralized federal system. 
lli See note 5 supra. 
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of safety requirements, it has exercised this power.16 However, in view 
of the purpose of central recording, and the limited provisions enacted 
to effectuate it, a similar pre-emption does not appear to have been in-
tended with respect to the law relating generally to all aspects of aircraft 
conveyancing. To allow such a pre-emption would be to abrogate the 
great volume of state statutory and common-law doctrines which relate 
to conveyancing of aircraft in favor of the simple rule that conveyances 
or instruments eligible for recordation under section 1403(a) and duly 
recorded under section I403(c) are inviolable.11 Although individual state 
recording procedures would seem inconsistent with, and hence pre-empted 
by, the nationwide notice provisions of section 1403, it would appear that 
Congress could not have intended such circumscribed regulatory provi-
sions to operate as the exclusive means of determining rights under air-
craft conveyances. Also, hearings incident to the enactment of the Civil 
Aeronautics Act and the regulations promulgated under it support the 
conclusion that Congress intended to provide an additional requirement, 
not an exclusive procedure, for conveyancing of interests in aircraft.18 
The problem of reconciling state law with federal recordation require-
ments, as seen regarding the validity of security interests in the principal 
case, has also arisen as to the question of priorities among interests pre-
ferred under state statute or common law and antecedent federally-recorded 
interests. At one extreme is the view of strict pre-emption proposed by 
Veterans' Air Express, whereby a federally-recorded lien is given priority 
over all other security interests;19 at the other are decisions which subor-
dinate a federally-recorded interest by applying related common-law 
doctrines which prefer repairmen's liens20 or equitable titles.21 Several 
states continue to enforce statutes granting priority to municipal airport 
or repairmen's liens over all other interests, presumably including those 
recorded under the Federal Aviation Act.22 The absence of uniformity 
in theory and application reflected by the cases would seem to be attrib-
utable not to a judicial distaste for federal regulation but rather to a sub-
stantial lack of guidance from the provisions of the federal recordation 
statute. No different is the problem of the validity of conveyances en-
16 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 1381, 1421, 72 Stat. 769, 54 Stat. 1235 (1940), 
49 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1421 (Supp. III, 1961). 
11 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 1403(a), (c), 72 Stat. 806, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1403(a), (c) 
(Supp. III, 1961). 
18 Hearings 407. 14 C.F.R. § 503.1 n.l (1962) (recordation of aircraft ownership) 
provides that "recordation of an instrument does not mean the instrument does, in fact, 
affect title to, or any interest in, an aircraft." See also United States v. United Aircraft 
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948). 
19 See also United States v. All Am. Airways, Inc., 180 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1950); 
Dawson v. General Discount Corp., 82 Ga. App. 29, 60 S.E.2d 653 (1950). 
20 See United States v. United Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948). 
21 See Marshall v. Bardin, 169 Kan. 534, 220 P.2d 187 (1950); see also Anderson v. 
Triair Associates, Inc., 1949 U.S. Av. 440 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1947). 
22 Scott, supra note 8, at 207. See ALA. CoDE tit. 4, § 29 (1958); ME. R.Ev. STAT. 
ANN. ch. 178, § 62 (1954). 
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countered in the principal case; in each setting it would appear that, if 
state law were made irrelevant to such determinations, there would remain 
a body of law quite inadequate to deal with the entirety of conveyancing 
problems. Noting the express provision for certain priorities in the Ship 
Mortgage Act of 1920,23 a plausible analogical argument could be made 
that, by the absence of similar provision in the Federal Aviation Act, 
congressional intent not to modify existing priority rules was indicated. 
If the theory of absolute "pre-emption" is rejected, as it should be, the 
question remains as to the proper relationship between section 1403 and 
state law affecting priorities of interests in aircraft. The best solution, 
from the standpoint of national uniformity, would be an amendment to 
section 1403 whereby definite and detailed provision would be made con-
cerning priorities;24 such legislation would necessarily preclude the ap-
plication of any state law whatsoever to priority questions. It would also 
produce the incidental advantage of certainty by obviating the need for 
recourse to divergent conflict of laws rules. Until such federal legislative 
action is forthcoming, however, it would seem reasonable to characterize 
section 1403 as a notice provision to be invoked for the protection of 
bona fide purchasers of interests in aircraft, rather than as establishing 
a preference in complete abrogation of established state law.25 Although 
the principal case is concerned only with the implications of constructive 
notice under federal recording as it affects validity of a mortgage interest, 
the theory of concurrent state and federal authority which it proposes 
should be a basic consideration of the courts, in cases where competing 
interests in aircraft are asserted, in arriving at some reasonable priority 
structure. 
William C. Brashares 
23 41 Stat. 1000, 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84 (1958). See also GILMORE &: BLACK, THE LAw 
OF ADMIRALTY § 9-68 (1957). 
24 It is suggested by Scott, supra note 8, at 210, that a provision similar to UNIFORM 
CoMl\lERCrAL CoDE § 9-310 would achieve the most acceptable priority structure. 
25 The only instance in which the federal recording statute essentially determines 
priority is where a security holder has failed to record his interest before a bona fide 
conveyance is made. As in the principal case, the security interest would be extinguished, 
See Scott, supra note 8, at 204. 
